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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TRACY VALDEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030056-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Valdez possessed a controlled substance in a drug free zone? 
a[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
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the crime for which he or she was convicted." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 118, 10 
P.3d 346, 352 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). 
Because this issue was not preserved at trial, this Court reviews it under a plain 
error standard. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory provisions is set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
Tracy Valdez appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court after being convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, and attempted obstruction of 
justice, a third degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Tracy Valdez was charged by information filed in the Fourth District Court on 
March 17, 2002, with possession or use of a controlled substance in a drug free zone, 
with a prior conviction, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); 
attempted obstruction of justice, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-8-306(l)(c); and driving on suspended or revoked operator's license, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 53-3-227(3)(a) (R. 6-7). 
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On May 9, 2002, Valdez filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence, asserting that 
the police violated his rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and 
Amendment IV to the United States Constitution, which protect citizens from 
unreasonable searches and seizures (R.32-41). On June 19, 2002, the district court 
denied the motion to suppress (R. 76-77; 297: 44). 
On September 16, 2002, Valdez filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude 
Defendant's Prior Convictions and Request for Notice of Intended 404(b) Evidence (R. 
110). 
Trial was held on September 24, 2002 (R. 298). At the morning of trial, 
Valdez's charge for driving with a suspended license was dismissed (R. 299: 9). 
During jury deliberation, the jury asked the trial court, "Can you be arrested for 
possessing illegal substances in a drug free zone if your physical arrest takes place 
outside the drug free zone?" (R. 152; 298: 334). The trial court responded with a 
simple "Yes" (R. 298: 338-39). After deliberation by the jury, Valdez was found 
guilty of possession or use of a controlled substance in a drug free zone, and guilty of 
attempted obstruction of justice (R. 255; 298: 340-41). 
At the sentencing hearing held on December 19, 2002, Valdez moved to reduce 
the first degree felony charge to a second degree felony pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-3-402, and the trial court granted the motion (R. 286; 299: 11, 18). 
Based on Valdez's conviction of illegal possession/use of a controlled substance, a 
second degree felony, he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one 
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year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 285; 299: 18). And based 
on Valdez's conviction of attempted obstruction of justice, he was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, both charges to 
run consecutively (R. 285; 299: 18). 
On January 17, 2003, Valdez timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the judgment, 
sentence, and commitment of this case (R. 292). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony of Officer Gary Giles 
Officer Giles testified the he works for the Orem Police Department, and that on 
March 11, 2002, he was conducting surveillance on an apartment located at 1565 South 
and 50 East in Orem (R. 298: 135, 140). Police had received several complaints from 
neighbors about possible drug activity occurring at the apartment (R. 298: 138). 
Giles was aware that Tracy Valdez was living at the apartment, and knew that 
Valdez had a suspended driver's license (R. 298: 139-40). Giles observed someone 
drive away from the apartment and decided to follow (R. 298: 141). However, Giles 
could not follow the driver directly so instead he went to where he thought the driver 
was headed (R. 298: 140-43). Giles lost contact with the vehicle for almost a minute 
(R. 298: 143). When Giles saw that Valdez was driving the car he immediately pulled 
Valdez over (R. 298: 144-45). 
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Giles immediately called for backup and then approached the vehicle (R. 298: 
145). Giles asked Valdez to step out of the vehicle and then noticed a liquor bottle with 
a broken seal in the car (R. 298: 145-46). Giles had Valdez walk to the back of the car 
so he could see whether Valdez had been drinking, and Valdez informed Giles that the 
bottle was empty (R. 298: 146). 
Giles noticed that Valdez was wearing Levi type jeans and that "both front 
pockets were very fall" (R. 298: 146). Giles asked Valdez whether he had any 
weapons on him and Valdez "immediately reached into one of his pockets and pulled 
out a folding knife" (R. 298: 147). Giles asked Valdez if he had any other weapons 
and told him not to reach into his pockets (R. 298: 147). Giles then conducted a pat-
down on Valdez, searching for other possible weapons (R. 298: 147). While Giles was 
touching the exterior of Valdez's pants pockets, Giles "brushed over the coin pocket" 
and testified "I could feel that there was something in that pocket also" (R. 298: 148). 
Giles testified that at that point, Valdez got nervous and told Giles "You can't do this" 
(R. 298: 148). Giles farther testified that "I pinched that pocket. As I did so, I felt the 
small bulge....In my experience, I've felt many items in the pocket, and many times 
I've felt small plastic baggies in the pockets. This had the same fell they did." (R. 298: 
211-12). Giles admitted, "To me, it felt like a small plastic bulge, as if an item that 
was rolled, some plastic feel to it." (R. 298: 211). Giles testified that at that point, he 
could tell that Valdez had not been drinking so he placed him under arrest for driving 
on suspension (R. 298: 149). 
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Giles then continued his search on Valdez and pulled out three baggies in 
Valdez's coin pocket on his blue jeans (R. 298: 150). One of the baggies appeared to 
contain methamphetamines (R. 298: 150). Giles put these items and others that he 
found on Valdez on the trunk of the car Valdez was driving (R. 298: 150). Giles 
testified that at this point, Valdez leaned forward "very quickly" and knocked the three 
baggies onto the ground (R. 298: 155-56). Valdez was handcuffed with his hands 
behind his back (R. 298: 155). Giles testified that he was behind Valdez and could not 
tell why he suddenly leaned forward (R. 298: 188). Giles testified that the baggies 
were knocked onto the ground after both he and Officer Lopez stabilized Valdez; 
however, in his report, Giles wrote down that he told Valdez to "spit it out," referring 
to the baggies (R. 298: 188). 
Giles also testified that the apartment where Valdez was staying was within 1000 
feet of two churches (R. 298: 161-63). Giles further testified that he stopped Valdez at 
1400 South and Main Street in Orem, right beside a RC Willey store (R. 298: 142). 
Giles testified that he believed that this stop occurred in a drug free zone because there 
was an RC Willey, Media Play, and Toys 'R' Us store close by where he pulled Valdez 
over and these stores were "shopping malls" (R. 298: 173-74). Giles did not testify 
specifically as to the distance between the stop and the shopping center, but stated that 
it "was mere feet away" (R. 298: 196). 
Giles further testified that he did not know where the drugs were pulled Valdez 
over (R. 298: 170). 
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Testimony of Officer Art Lopez 
Officer Lopez testified that he works with the Orem Police Department, and that 
on March 11, 2002, he responded to Officer Giles's request for assistance (R. 298: 
214). When Lopez arrived, Valdez was already out of the car and walking towards the 
back of the car (R. 298: 215). Lopez testified that Giles was checking for weapons on 
Valdez when he felt his right front coin pocket and asked Valdez what that was (R. 
298: 215). At this point, Giles arrested Valdez (R. 298: 215-16) 
Lopez testified that he observed Giles retrieve the plastic baggies from Valdez7s 
small coin pocket (R. 298: 218). Giles put the baggies along with other items from 
Valdez's pockets on the trunk of the car (R. 298: 220). Then, Valdez started moving 
his head toward the plastic baggies on the trunk and "his lips were close to touching the 
plastic bags" (R. 298: 221). Lopez testified that it appeared that Valdez was attempting 
to grasp the bags in his lips (R. 298: 220). 
Lopez also testified that Valdez is his step-cousin and they have known each 
other their whole lives (R. 298: 216). 
Testimony of Shannon Nielson 
Shannon Nielson testified that Valdez was living in her apartment during March 
2002 (R. 298: 257). Nielson testified that after the police arrested Valdez, they came 
back to her apartment to arrest her also (R. 298: 261-63). Nielson testified that she had 
methamphetamines in her hand when the officers came to her apartment (R. 298: 263). 
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However, Nielson testified that she was unaware that Valdez had any drugs on him (R. 
298: 260). 
Nielson also testified that she and Valdez often exchange clothing because they 
are the same size (R. 298: 261). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Valdez 
possessed a controlled substance in a drug-free zone. The State could only prove that 
the apartment Valdez was staying at was in a drug-free zone. However, the State did 
not and could not prove that Valdez possessed methamphetamines while he was at the 
apartment. 
Valdez asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for a directed 
verdict regarding the drug-free zone penalty enhancement; and further, that it was plain 
error for the trial court to submit this enhancement to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT VALDEZ POSSESSED A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITHIN A DRUG FREE ZONE 
Valdez's conviction for possession of a controlled substance was enhanced 
because it allegedly occurred within a drug-free zone pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 58-37-8(4)(a)(vi). The State argued that the "drug-free zone" enhancement was 
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violated either by Valdez possessing drugs at the apartment or when he was pulled over 
by the officer beside a shopping center (R. 298: 303-04, 325). Valdez asserts that the 
evidence was insufficient to allow the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
offense occurred within a drug-free zone and that it was plain error for the trial court to 
submit the enhancement to the jury. 
"[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he or she was convicted."' State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 118, 10 
P.3d 346, 352 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). 
"[T]o establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence 
was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the 
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the 
case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 117. 
A. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Valdez was in possession of a 
controlled substance at the apartment he was staying at. 
At trial, the State showed that Valdez was staying at an apartment that was 
located within 1,000 feet of two church buildings, thus constituting a drug-free zone 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(vi) (R. 298: 161-63). However, the 
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evidence was insufficient to establish that Valdez was in possession of a controlled 
substance while at the apartment. 
Drug-free enhancement is an element to the underlying drug offense that "must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who decides the predicate 
offense." State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah App. 1996). See also State v. 
Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah App. 1989) cert denied 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
The pertinent elements of possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone are 
(1) knowingly or intentionally, (2) possessing a controlled substance (3) within 1,000 
feet a drug free zone. See Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8. 
The only evidence the State presented was that Valdez possessed 
methamphetamines when he was stopped by Officer Giles at 1400 South Main Street in 
Orem and that the apartment Valdez was staying at located at 1565 South 50 East was 
within 1,000 feet of two church buildings (R. 298: 135, 140, 161). The State could not 
and did not prove that Valdez was in possession of a controlled substance while at the 
apartment. 
Thus, the State failed to present evidence that Valdez knowingly possessed a 
controlled substance while at the apartment. In fact, Officer Giles testified that when 
he saw Valdez leave the apartment and drive away, he could not follow Valdez (R.298: 
140-43). Moreover, Valdez was out of Giles's site for almost a minute (R. 298: 143). 
Giles even testified that he did not know where the drugs were at during this time and 
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the State admitted in closing argument that it could not prove with certainty that Valdez 
had drugs in his possession when he was at the apartment (R. 298: 170, 305). 
There was more than sufficient time for Valdez to buy methamphetamines from 
someone without stopping his car during the time that Officer Giles could not see 
Valdez nor know what he was doing. Further, Shannon Nielson testified that she and 
Valdez often exchanged clothes and it is possible that the methamphetamines found in 
the small coin pocket were actually Nielson's and that Valdez had no knowledge of 
them (R. 298: 261). In fact, at the time Valdez was arrested, Nielson was in possession 
of methamphetamines back at the apartment and was surprised that Valdez was arrested 
for possessing methamphetamines (R. 298: 260). 
Valdez asserts that the evidence was inconclusive as to whether he knowingly 
possessed methamphetamines at the apartment, thus the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that he knowingly possessed a controlled substance while within a drug-free 
zone. The fact that the State did not present sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Valdez knowingly possessed a controlled substance while at the apartment 
should have been obvious to the trial court. 
B. A shopping center is not a drug free zone. 
The State also argued that Valdez was pulled over and stopped in a drug free 
zone by claiming that a shopping center and a shopping mall are the same for statutory 
purposes (R. 298: 304). Valdez asserts that this argument is unsupportable under the 
plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a). 
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"In interpreting statutes, we first look to the plain language of the statute. In 
considering the plain language of a statute, courts presume that the legislature used each 
word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning. We consider other methods of statutory construction only when a statute is 
ambiguous." State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App 217, T7, 73 P.3d 978 (citations 
omitted). 
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Addition, 
2000, defines shopping mall as: "1 . An urban shopping area limited to pedestrians. 2. 
A shopping center with stores and businesses facing a system of enclosed walkways for 
pedestrians." It defines a shopping center as "A group of stores and often restaurants 
and other businesses having a common parking lot." Id. 
Thus, while a mall may be included as a shopping center, a shopping center is 
not a mall according to the plain language of the enhancement penalty. 
Moreover, in State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146 (Utah App. 1996), this Court 
stated this penalty enhancement statute was enacted "to protect the public health, safety, 
and welfare of children of Utah from the presumed extreme potential danger created 
when drug transactions occur on or near a school ground [or other public places 
frequented by children]. Thus, the law's overarching purpose is to create 'drug-free 
zones' around schools and other specified places 'to protect children from the influence 
of drug-related activity.'" Id. at 149. 
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It is clear that the enhancement penalty was enacted to protect places frequented 
by children for obvious reasons. While it is also obvious that children do frequent 
shopping malls, children do not frequent shopping centers, especially the shopping 
center in question which contained a large furniture store (R. 298: 173). Accordingly, 
a shopping center does not fall within the plain language of this statute, nor was it 
intended to. 
C. The trial court's error was harmful to Valdez, 
Valdez's conviction for possessing or using a controlled substance was enhanced 
because it allegedly occurred in a drug-free zone and because of a prior conviction (R. 
6-7). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court reduced the charge to a second degree 
felony pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-402, resulting in a commitment of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 299: 11, 18). 
Valdez asserts that but for the enhancement penalty, his charge would have been only a 
third degree felony. 
In summation, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Valdez knowingly 
or intentionally possessed a controlled substance in a drug-free zone and it was plain 
and obvious error for the trial court to submit this penalty to the jury. Furthermore, 
Valdez asserts that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable sentencing 
outcome but for this error. 
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H. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
Valdez asserts that he was denied ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial 
counsel failed to motion for a directed verdict regarding the drug-free zone 
enhancement penalty at the end of the State's case in chief. 
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for 
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a 
conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); see Tillman v. 
Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on 
failure to move to dismiss where evidence to convict was sufficient). In order to 
establish ineffective counsel, it is the defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and second, that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, [^25, 1 
P.3d 546 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994)); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State 
v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
If this Court finds that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, then 
under the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Cook, the two prong test set out in 
Strickland is satisfied. Because the evidence was insufficient to submit the drug-free 
zone enhancement penalty to the jury, Valdez's counsel's performance "fell below an 
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objective standard of professional judgment." See Kelley, 2000 UT 41, at ^ 25. 
Additionally, but for the failure to make a motion for a directed verdict, Valdez would 
not have been sentenced to a second degree felony. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Valdez asks this Court to reverse his conviction for 
the drug-free zone enhancement, and enter judgment for possession of a controlled 
substance, and remand the matter to the trial court for imposition of sentence. 
Powasnik, 918 P.2d at 150 n.2; and State v. South, 932 P.2d 622, 627 n.4 (Utah App.) 
cert denied, 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1997). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this gb_ day of October, 2003. 
h^fi^%^/(ViX/ 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 232 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as denned in Section 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of posses-
sion of any controlled substance by a person, that person 
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with 
respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsec-
tion (4)(c) who, in an offense not amounting to a violation 
of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and 
intentionally having in his body any measurable 
amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as denned in Section 
76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bod-
ily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death 
of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
at tempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, T t^le 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under this Subsection (4) if the act is 
committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any
 0f 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta-
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsec-
tions (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as 
defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot 
or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, oi 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) througl 
(viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younge 
than 18 years of age, regardless of where the ac 
occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) 
guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned i 
a term of not less than five years if the penalty that wou 
otherwise have been established but for this subsectu 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and tl 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have be 
established would have been less than a first degi 
felony but for this Subsection (4), a person conyici 
under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty 
one degree more than the maximum penalty prescnb 
for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under 
Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed 
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; 
that the actor mistakenly believed tha t the location wh 
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4 
or was unaware that the location where the act occui 
was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no pen31 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this sec i 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or adm^11 
tive penalty or sanction authorized by law.
 f 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a 
law or the law of another state, conviction or acq 
under federal law or the law of another state for^ 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chap 
dence or proof which shows a person or persons P 
